Metock, a national of Cameroon, arrived in Ireland on 23 June 2006 and applied for asylum. His application was definitively refused on 28 February 2007.

Ngo Ikeng, born a national of Cameroon, has acquired United Kingdom nationality. She has resided and worked in Ireland since late 2006.

Metock and Ngo Ikeng met in Cameroon in 1994 and have been in a relationship since then. They have two children, one born in 1998 and the other in 2006. They were married in Ireland on 12 October 2006.

On 6 November 2006 Metock applied for a residence card as the spouse of a European Union citizen working and residing in Ireland. The application was refused by decision of the Minister for Justice of 28 June 2007, on the ground that Mr Metock did not satisfy the condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State required by Regulation 3(2) of the 2006 Regulations.

Metock, Ngo Ikeng and their children brought proceedings against that decision. The European court of justice ruled in favour of the family.(Directive 2004/38/EC on the right to move and reside freely)

The Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely (Freedom of movement for workers) within the territory of the Member States defines the right of free movement for citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes the European Union (EU) and the three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

This directive is mostly a concentration of existing regulations and directives in one place, although it does also extend the rights of unmarried couples.

While some of the formulations are a bit complicated for historic reasons, the basic premise of the directive is very simple: EEA citizens have the right of free movement and residence across the European Economic Area, as long as they are not an undue burden on the country of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover.[4] This right also extends to close family members that are not EEA citizens.

After five years, the right of residence becomes permanent, which means it does not depend on any precondition any longer. This permanent right of residence can be seen as a precursor to a true European Citizenship

In 1974, Meletis Apostolides, an architect, was displaced with his family from his property in Lapithos as a result of the Turkish invasion and subsequent military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus.

In 2002 David Charles and Linda Elizabeth Orams, from Hove, Sussex, England, invested £160,000 of their retirement fund to acquire the land from a third party and to construct a villa on the premises. The third party claimed to have acquired the property from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, an entity which, to this day, has not been recognised by any State except the Republic of Turkey.The Orams used the property in Cyprus for vacations and maintained a separate property in the UK.

In 2003 the de facto administration of Northern Cyprus eased crossing restrictions along the ceasefire line giving the opportunity to displaced Cypriots to visit their old properties. Meletis Apostolides visited his property and confirmed the construction of the house occupied by the Orams.

The case has been described as a landmark test case as it sets a precedent for other Cypriots (primarily Greek Cypriot refugees) to bring similar actions to court.The importance of the case is illustrated by the fact that the Orams were funded by Turkish property developers whilst Mr Apostolides was supported by Greek-Cypriot interests.

Both the British High Commission in Cyprus  and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have issued warnings regarding the purchase of property in Northern Cyprus. of the record o

Greece had asked the IMO Maritime Safety Committee to examine the creation of check lists or other appropriate tools for assisting the Contracting States of the SOLAS Convention in monitoring whether ships and port facilities complied with the requirements of Chapter XI-2 of the Annex to that convention and the ISPS Code. The Commission argued that, since the adoption of Regulation 725/2004 , integrating both Chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code into Community law, the Community had enjoyed exclusive competence to assume international obligations in the area covered by that regulation. It argued that, therefore, the Community alone was competent to ensure that the standards on the subject were properly applied at Community level and to discuss with other IMO Contracting States the correct implementation of or subsequent developments in those standards, in accordance with the two measures referred to.

The Commission found that the Member States therefore no longer had competence to submit to the IMO national positions on matters falling within the exclusive competence of the Community, unless expressly authorised to do so by the Community.

The Court reiterated that under art. 3(1)(f) EC, the setting of a common policy in the sphere of transport was specifically mentioned as one of the objectives of the Community. Under art. 10 EC, the Member States must both take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EC Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions and also abstain from any measure which might jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty (Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971]).

The Court held that to the extent to which Community rules were promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the Member States could not, outside the framework of the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those rules or alter their scope. The provisions of Regulation 725/2004 , which had as its legal basis art. 80(2) EC, the second subparagraph of which referred to art. 71 EC, were Community rules promulgated for the attai

At first glance, this decision seems to indicate that the ECJ has taken a different path, moving away from its earlier Kalanke decision which had jeopardised further development of affirmative action in the European Union. On a closer examination, both Kalanke’s sweeping ban of preferential treatment based on gender and Marschall’s new interpretation appear as discursive replies to the same dilemma: should the Court deny the normative objective of equality contained in EC law to generate meaning, thus turning equality into a mere formal principle and rendering judicial review trivial? Or should it embrace a substantive reading of the fundamental principle of equality between men and women, thus substituting the Court judgment for that of the legislature, and subverting the limits of the ECJ’s powers?.